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CONVERSION THERAPY AND FREE SPEECH: A DOCTRINAL
AND THEORETICAL FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
CLAY CALVERT,* KARA CARNLEY,** BRITTANY LINK,***
& LINDA RIEDEMANN****
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes, from both a doctrinal and theoretical
perspective, the First Amendment speech interests at stake before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Welch v. Brown
and Pickup v. Brown. Those cases pivot on a controversial California
law banning mental health providers from performing sexual orien-
tation change efforts (also known as conversion therapy) on minors.
Two district court judges reached radically different conclusions about
the First Amendment questions. The Article explores how a trio of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions involving seemingly disparate factual
scenarios—Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, United
States v. Alvarez and Gonzales v. Carhart—and three venerable
theories of free speech—the marketplace of ideas, democratic self-
governance and individual self-realization—might ultimately affect
the outcome of the cases and others in the future involving conver-
sion therapy.
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CONCLUSION
PREFACE
In August 2013, subsequent to the acceptance of this Article
for publication, a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown1 upheld California
Senate Bill 1172—the measure at the heart of this Article banning
conversion therapy for minors—as “a regulation of professional con-
duct.” 2 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that SB 1172 “regu-
lates only treatment” 3 and that “any effect it may have on free
speech interests is merely incidental.” 4
The appellate court thus analyzed the law under the very def-
erential rational basis standard of review, rather than the more rig-
orous strict scrutiny test.5 It concluded “that SB 1172 is rationally
related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the well-
being of minors.” 6 In brief, the appellate court largely dodged the
First Amendment free speech issues addressed in this Article.
On January 29, 2014, the same three-member panel, comprised
of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and Judges Susan P. Graber and Morgan
1. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 1048.
3. Id. at 1056.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1056–57.
6. Id. at 1057.
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Christen, issued an amended opinion replacing the August 2013 rul-
ing but reaching the exact same result.7 Writing for the panel, Judge
Graber once again classified SB 1172 as “a regulation of professional
conduct.” 8 She added that the measure “bans a form of treatment
for minors; it does nothing to prevent licensed therapists from dis-
cussing the pros and cons of SOCE with their patients. Senate Bill
1172 merely prohibits licensed mental health providers from engag-
ing in SOCE with minors.”9
As with its August 2013 opinion, the panel found that the Cali-
fornia law was “subject to only rational basis review and must be
upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-
est.”10 It had little problem in finding that California had satisfied
this burden, reasoning that the “overwhelming consensus” of the
Golden State lawmakers was that sexual orientation change efforts
are “harmful and ineffective.”11 The Ninth Circuit thus concluded
that SB 1172 was “rationally related to the legitimate government
interest of protecting the well-being of minors.”12
The only substantive changes and/or additions in the amended
January 2014 opinion were the panel’s new: 1) consideration and
rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2010 opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project supported their
position;13 and 2) reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights to but-
tress the conclusion that “[b]ecause SB 1172 regulates a professional
practice that is not inherently expressive, it does not implicate the
First Amendment.”14
Ted Lieu, the California lawmaker who sponsored SB 1172,
dubbed the Ninth Circuit’s January 29, 2014 decision a “cement over
the nail in the coffin of the bogus practice of ‘reparative’ therapy.”15
On the same day the Ninth Circuit issued its amended opinion
turning back the First Amendment free-speech challenge in Pickup
to SB 1172; it also denied a petition for rehearing en banc.16 Yet,
three judges—Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Carlos T. Bea, and Sandra
7. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).
8. Id. at 1222.
9. Id. at 1229.
10. Id. at 1231.
11. Id. at 1233.
12. Id. 
13. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
14. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic and Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
15. Cheryl Wetzstein, Calif. ‘Change’ Therapy Ban Is Legal, Says Court, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2014, at A6.
16. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1208.
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S. Ikuta—issued a strong dissent from the denial of rehearing that
openly questioned the conclusion that SB 1172 regulates conduct
and not speech.17 Writing for the trio, Judge O’Scannlain tidily en-
capsulated their argument when he opined:
The State of California, in the statute at issue here, has prohib-
ited licensed professionals from saying certain words to their
clients. By labeling such speech as “conduct,” the [Ninth Circuit]
panel’s opinion has entirely exempted such regulation from the
First Amendment. In so doing, the panel contravenes recent Su-
preme Court precedent, ignores established free speech doctrine,
misreads our cases, and thus insulates from First Amendment
scrutiny California’s prohibition—in the guise of a professional
regulation—of politically unpopular expression.18
Fleshing out this argument, O’Scannlain added that the Ninth
Circuit panel that ruled against David Pickup and his fellow plain-
tiffs “provides no principled doctrinal basis for its dichotomy: by
what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly
‘speech,’ on the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand,
somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct?’”19
On February 3, 2014, the Ninth Circuit stayed its ruling in
Pickup for ninety days, pending resolution of a petition for writ of
certiorari filed by the plaintiffs.20 A petition for writ of certiorari
was filed with the nation’s high court on February 6, 2014.21
Regardless of the ultimate outcome in Pickup, the same First
Amendment issues addressed in that case and in this Article are
sure to arise again in the near future in other cases involving bans
on conversion therapy. For instance, in November 2013 a federal
district court in King v. Christie22 upheld New Jersey’s recently en-
acted law banning conversion therapy for minors. In that case, U.S.
District Judge Freda L. Wolfson cited favorably the Ninth Circuit’s
August 2013 ruling in Pickup to similarly conclude that New Jersey’s
17. Id. at 1215–21 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 1215.
19. Id. at 1215–16.
20. Order, Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://cdn
.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/02/03/12-17681_order_staying_mandate.pdf.
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pickup v. Brown, available at http://www.lc.org
/media/9980/attachments/0214_pr_9th_appeals_ca_petition_change_therapy_ban_pickup
.pdf; see Press Release, Liberty Counsel, Liberty Counsel Petitions Supreme Court on
Change Therapy Ban (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?PID
=14100&PRID=1404.
22. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160035 (D. N.J. Nov. 8, 2013).
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statute “regulates conduct, not speech.” 23 That decision has yet to
be considered by the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit.
In 2014, a similar measure that would ban conversion therapy
for minors was proposed in Virginia.24 Liberty Counsel, which rep-
resents plaintiff David Pickup, wrote in a press release in February
2014 that “[c]hange therapy bans have also been proposed in Massa-
chusetts, Maryland, New York, Virginia, and Washington. Liberty
Counsel is communicating with legislators in those states as well.
If legislation passes in other states and minors and counselors ask
for our help, we will file similar lawsuits.” 25
The bottom line is that the First Amendment speech issues
surrounding bans on sexual orientation change efforts for minors,
including the most fundamental and foundational issue of whether
speech is even at issue, are still very much unsettled and will be
litigated for some time to come. Thus, the authors—with the blessing
of the editors—have chosen not to disturb or change the original ver-
sion of their analysis and arguments made when this Article was
first accepted for publication. The Article, therefore, reads substan-
tively as it was originally written, with this preface providing the
latest status on the battle over California’s law.
INTRODUCTION
No one should stand idly by while children are be-
ing psychologically abused, and anyone who forces
a child to try to change their sexual orientation must
understand this is unacceptable.26
That was the sentiment expressed by Ted Lieu, a California
state senator,27 in September 2012 while lauding Governor Edmund
23. Id. at *50.
24. Markus Schmidt, Bill Would Ban Gay Conversion Therapy for Minors, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2014, at A6.
25. Press Release, Liberty Counsel, Ninth Circuit Stays Ruling on California Change
Therapy Ban (Feb. 4, 1014), available at http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?PID=14102&Alert
ID=1722.
26. Press Release, Senator Ted W. Lieu, New Calif. Law Bans ‘Gay’ to ‘Straight’
Therapy for Minors (Oct. 2, 2012) [hereinafter New Calif. Law], http://sd28.senate.ca.gov
/news/2012-10-02-washington-blade-new-calif-law-bans-%E2%80%98gay-%E2%80
%98straight-therapy-minors.
27. An attorney by educational training at Georgetown University, Lieu clerked for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and later practiced law at Munger, Tolles
& Olson. He currently represents California’s 28th Senate District, which includes the
Southern California cities of Carson, El Segundo, Hermosa Beach, Lomita, Manhattan
Beach, Redondo Beach and Torrance, as well as portions of Long Beach, Los Angeles and
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G. “Jerry” Brown, Jr., for signing into law a Lieu-sponsored mea-
sure, Senate Bill 1172.28 The law prohibits mental health providers
in the Golden State from engaging in sexual orientation change ef-
forts (hereinafter SOCE)29 with minors.30 The statute is the first of
its kind in the nation and, as the New York Times observed, has
“been hailed by gay rights advocates and mainstream mental health
groups that call therapies that try to alter the sexual orientation of
youths potentially damaging.” 31 Conversely, a number of individuals
dubbed “ex-gay men,” who “believe they have changed their most ba-
sic sexual desires through some combination of therapy and prayer,”
consider the California law “an assault on their own validity.” 32
Sometimes “known as sexual conversion or sexual reorientation
therapy,” 33 SOCE involves “assisting individuals to have sex with
those to whom they do not erotically prefer. For some, this choice is
motivated by the social attractiveness of heterosexuality. For others,
it is more a desire to avoid punishment or other feared negative
consequences.” 34 The debate over SOCE, which was spawned in the
1950s out of “[a] combination of social factors, legal sanctions against
homosexual behaviour and the rise of behaviourism,” 35 today cuts
across professional, political, religious, and cultural lines.36
A 2008 article published in Ethics & Behavior encapsulates the
controversy well, noting that although “homosexuality has been
San Pedro. See Biography, SENATOR TED W. LIEU, http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/biography
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (providing this information and other biographical details
about Lieu).
28. New Calif. Law, supra note 26.
29. The California law defines SOCE to encompass “any practices by mental health
providers that seek to change an individual’s sexual orientation. This includes efforts to
change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic
attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 865(b)(1) (2013).
30. Id. § 865.1.
31. Erik Eckholm, Clashing Rulings Complicate Path of Gay ‘Conversion Therapy’
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A16 [hereinafter Eckholm, Clashing Rulings].
32. Erik Eckholm, ‘Ex-Gay’ Men Fight Back Against View That Homosexuality Can’t
Be Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2012, at A16 [hereinafter Eckholm, Ex-Gay Men Fight
Back].
33. Elan Y. Karten & Jay C. Wade, Sexual Orientation Change Efforts in Men: A
Client Perspective, 18 J. MEN’S STUD. 84, 84 (2010).
34. A. Lee Beckstead, Can We Change Sexual Orientation?, 41 ARCHIVE SEXUAL BEHAV.
121, 127 (2012).
35. Annie Bartlett et al., The Response of Mental Health Professionals to Clients
Seeking Help to Change or Redirect Same-Sex Sexual Orientation, 9 BMC PSYCHIATRY
11 (2009).
36. See Jack Drescher, Ethical Concerns Raised When Patients Seek to Change Same-
Sex Attractions, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 181, 183 (2001) (“The political nature
of this issue has been addressed in professional journals . . . . [T]he reparative therapy
debate has moved out of the professional arena and into the cultural one. It has included
advertisements in major newspapers promoting religious ‘cures’ for homosexuality.” ).
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declassified as a mental disorder for 30 years and despite various
professional organizations’ rejection of CT [conversion therapy] as
an unethical, harmful, and empirically invalid practice . . . conver-
sion or reparative techniques continue to receive both scholarly and
clinical support.” 37 In particular, as Craig Stewart points out, “Exodus
International, an umbrella organization for ‘ex-gay’ ministries, and
the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality
(NARTH), a group representing ‘reparative therapists,’ maintain that
homosexuality is a mental illness and can be treated, either through
prayer or therapy.” 38
Given the long-standing debate over whether to ban or further
develop SOCE,39 it is anything but surprising that Senator Lieu’s
legislative crackdown on SOCE was met with stiff legal resistance in
some quarters. In particular, two lawsuits were filed by conservative
law groups claiming the California ban on SOCE for minors consti-
tutes an unconstitutional infringement on, among other things, the
freedom of speech.40 One of those groups, the Pacific Justice Insti-
tute (hereinafter PJI),41 issued a press release in which its president,
Brad Dacus, explained the PJI’s concerns with Lieu’s law:
This outrageous bill makes no exceptions for young victims of
sexual abuse who are plagued with unwanted same-sex attrac-
tion, nor does it respect the consciences of mental health profes-
sionals who work in a church. We are filing suit to defend families,
children, and religious freedom. This unprecedented bill is outra-
geously unconstitutional.42
On December 3, 2012—less than one month before Lieu’s measure
was to take effect on January 1, 2013—U.S. District Judge William
37. Robert J. Cramer et al., Weighing the Evidence: Empirical Assessment and Ethical
Implications of Conversion Therapy, 18 ETHICS & BEHAV. 93, 94 (2008).
38. Craig O. Stewart, A Rhetorical Approach to News Discourse: Media Representa-
tions of a Controversial Study on ‘Reparative Therapy,’ 69 W.J. COMM. 147, 153 (2005).
39. See A. Lee Beckstead & Susan L. Morrow, Mormon Clients’ Experiences of Conver-
sion Therapy: The Need for a New Treatment Approach, 32 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST
651, 651 (2004) (“A long-standing debate has addressed the pros and cons of sexual reorien-
tation therapy—specif ically, whether to ban or further develop such treatments.” ).
40. Erik Eckholm, Gay ‘Conversion Therapy’ Faces Test in Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2012, at A18.
41. See About Us, PAC. JUSTICE INST., http://www.pacificjustice.org/about-us.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014) (describing the PJI as “a non-prof it 501(c)(3) legal defense organi-
zation specializing in the defense of religious freedom, parental rights, and other civil
liberties. Pacif ic Justice Institute works diligently, without charge, to provide its clients
with all the legal support they need”).
42. Press Release, Pac. Justice Inst., It’s Official: Gov. Brown Signs Gay Therapy Ban;
PJI Filing Suit (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.pacificjustice.org/1/post/2012/09/its-official-gov
-brown-signs-gay-therapy-ban-pji-f iling-suit.html.
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Shubb in Welch v. Brown43 issued a preliminary injunction, on be-
half of several providers of SOCE, stopping its enforcement. Judge
Shubb initially determined the law was subject to the strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review44 that is traditionally applied to content-
based regulations of speech45 under First Amendment46 jurisprudence.
He then held that California could not, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2011 ruling in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
involving another content-based statute from California,47 demon-
strate proof of causation of harm to minors caused by SOCE.48
43. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
44. Id. at 1105 (holding that “SB 1172 is subject to strict scrutiny”); see United States
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548–49 (2012) (using the term “ ‘exacting scrutiny’” in place
of strict scrutiny, and noting that to satisfy this test the government must do more than
merely recite a “compelling” interest. It must also demonstrate that the “chosen restriction
on the speech at issue be ‘actually necessary’ to achieve its interest” and prove “a direct
causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented”); Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (observing that a law “passes strict
scrutiny” only if “it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn
to serve that interest”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(opining that a content-based speech restriction “can stand only if it satisf ies strict scru-
tiny,” and noting that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest”); see also Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Deter-
minations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 598 (2003) (“The entire class of content-based
restrictions—whether or not they also discriminate according to viewpoint—receive
strict scrutiny.” ); Joel Timmer, Violence as Obscenity: Offensiveness and the First
Amendment, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 28 (2010) (“Under strict scrutiny, the government
must show that a restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest
and that the restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” ).
45. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
(“Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, dis-
advantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” ); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 444 (1996) (asserting, prior to her promotion to
the U.S. Supreme Court as an associate justice, that “in most contexts, a strict scrutiny
standard applies to content-based action of all kinds”).
46. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorpo-
rated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and off icials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
47. Brown involved a California statute that “prohibits the sale or rental of ‘violent
video games’ to minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled ‘18.’ ” Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (2011).
48. The Supreme Court in Brown held that a government entity must demonstrate
causation of harm, rather than a mere correlation between speech and harm, and that
“ambiguous proof will not suff ice.” Id. at 2739. See Clay Calvert et al., Social Science,
Media Effects & the Supreme Court: Is Communication Research Relevant After Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Association?, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 293 (2012) (addressing
the various opinions in Brown as they relate to proof of harm caused by speech).
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Judge Shubb reasoned that California’s proffered “evidence that
SOCE ‘may’ cause harm to minors based on questionable and scien-
tifically incomplete studies that may not have included minors is
unlikely to satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny.” 49 Zeroing in on
California’s apparent “inability to distinguish between harm caused
by SOCE versus other factors,” 50 Judge Shubb emphasized that
“[t]he few and arguably incomplete studies addressing harms of
SOCE do not appear to have assessed whether the harms reported
after undergoing SOCE were caused by SOCE as opposed to other
internal or external factors and thus would have been sustained
regardless of SOCE.” 51 Putting the slight delay of the law’s enforce-
ment wrought by the injunction into historical context, Judge Shubb
noted that “California has arguably survived 150 years without this
law and it would be a stretch of reason to conclude that it would suffer
significant harm having to wait a few more months to know whether
the law is enforceable as against the three plaintiffs in this case.” 52
But the very next day, a different federal judge in Pickup v.
Brown53 refused to enjoin California’s law prohibiting SOCE on mi-
nors.54 The plaintiffs in Pickup included both mental health profes-
sionals and minor patients seeking SOCE.55 In diametric opposition
to the result reached by Judge Shubb, Judge Kimberly Mueller con-
cluded that a First Amendment speech issue was not even raised by
the law because SOCE therapy “is conduct.” 56 Judge Mueller rea-
soned that “plaintiff therapists have not shown they are likely to suc-
ceed in bearing their burden of showing that the First Amendment
applies to SOCE treatment; they have not shown that the treat-
ment, the end product of which is a change of behavior, is expressive
conduct entitled to First Amendment protection.” 57
Playing on this critical speech-conduct dichotomy,58 Judge Mueller
concluded that because the mental health professional plaintiffs did
not have a fundamental right—namely, a First Amendment speech
49. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1122.
53. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
54. Id. at *26.
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id. at *10.
57. Id.
58. See Editorial, A Divide on ‘Conversion’ Therapy Law, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012,
at A17 (observing that Judge Shubb and Judge Mueller “differed on a crucial question:
Does the law regulate speech or conduct?”); see Edward J. Eberle, The Architecture of First
Amendment Free Speech, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1191, 1216–20 (2011) (providing an ex-
cellent analysis of the speech-conduct dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence).
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interest—at stake, the California law was only subject to the highly
deferential rational basis59 level of scrutiny.60 She quickly concluded
that, as to the mental health professional plaintiffs, “SB 1172 passes
the rational basis test.” 61
As to the alleged First Amendment speech interests of the mi-
nor plaintiffs in Pickup to be “able to receive or hear about SOCE,” 62
Judge Mueller initially made two observations seemingly favorable
to them:
• “The First Amendment protects listeners’ right to re-
ceive information,” 63 and
• “Communication between doctors and patients can
implicate patients’ rights to free speech.” 64
Judge Mueller then quickly rejected the minors’ First Amend-
ment arguments, reasoning that she had “already concluded that
SB 1172’s restrictions on SOCE do not implicate the First Amend-
ment right to free speech in analyzing plaintiff therapists’ claim.
The minors’ claim is but the ‘flip side of that coin.’” 65 Perhaps un-
surprisingly for a case fraught with political implications, the Los
Angeles Times wryly pointed out that Judge Mueller was appointed
to the federal bench by President Barack Obama, while Judge Shubb
was appointed by former President George H. W. Bush.66 Judge
Mueller’s decision upholding the law was immediately appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit67 which,
59. John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda explain rational basis review as:
the test used in cases that do not involve a fundamental right and wherein
the Court does not f ind a classif ication of persons for whom there should be
special judicial protection (such as racial, national origin, gender or illegiti-
macy classif ications). The rationality test is easy to state: the classif ication
only has to have a rational relationship to any legitimate government in-
terest in order to comply with the equal protection guarantee.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (8th ed. 2010).
60. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring)).
66. See Maura Dolan, Gay ‘Conversion’ Ban Faces Uncertain Outcome, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2012, at A41 (noting that California’s law “has divided the lower courts. A fed-
eral judge in Sacramento appointed by President Obama found that the law did not
violate free speech rights; her colleague, appointed by the f irst President Bush, con-
cluded that it did”).
67. Cheryl Wetzstein, Fight Over Sex-Change Therapy Escalates; Conservative Group
to Make Emergency Appeal to Block New Law, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A8.
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given its “reputation of ideological division and conflict,” 68 seemed a
fitting venue for such a politically and culturally charged issue.
On December 21, 2012, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit granted the plaintiffs’ request for an emergency injunction in
Pickup, thus stymieing Judge Mueller’s opinion and stopping the law
from taking effect pending a full appellate hearing before a different
group of three judges sometime in 2013.69 The Liberty Counsel,70
which backs the Pickup plaintiffs, lauded the decision in a press re-
lease, referring to the statute as “politically motivated to interfere
with counselors and clients. Liberty Counsel is thankful that the
Ninth Circuit blocked the law from going into effect. This law is an
astounding overreach by the government into the realm of counsel-
ing and would have caused irreparable harm.” 71
Thus, by late December of 2012, the controversy rested upon
two days and two counterposed district court opinions, followed by
an emergency appellate-court injunction and heated, and roiling
emotions in legal challenges. The Sacramento Bee, in a front-page
story, asserted this “could become landmark litigation.” 72 Indeed,
68. Corey Rayburn Yung, Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and
Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 535 (2012); see Marsha
S. Berzon, Introduction, 41 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 287, 287 (2011) (stating, from her
position as Ninth Circuit judge, that “the judges of the Ninth Circuit are a wildly diverse
lot, and we produce opinions that reflect that diversity”).
Some, including conservative politicians, believe the Ninth Circuit is too liberal. See
John P. Freeman, Protecting Judicial Independence, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 511, 515
(2012) (noting that during the 2012 race to become the Republican nominee for President
of the United States, two of the leading candidates—Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum—
“sought to pander to right-wing groups by calling publicly for abolition of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals”).
69. Order, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (No. 12-17681) (E.D. Cal. 2012), available
at http://coop.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2012/12/21/Pickup_Injunction.pdf; see
John King, Conversion Therapy Ban Put on Hold, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2012, at C1 (not-
ing that the “three-judge panel gave no reason for its decision Friday stating only that
appellants’ emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal is granted’ and that the
already-established schedule for the appeal would remain in place”).
70. The organization describes itself as:
an international nonprofit litigation, education, and policy organization ded-
icated to advancing religious freedom, the sanctity of life, and the family
since 1989, by providing pro bono assistance and representation on these and
related topics. With off ices in Florida, Virginia and Washington, D.C., and
an outreach in Israel, Liberty Counsel has hundreds of advocates around
the world.
About Us, LIBERTY COUNSEL, http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?pid=14096 (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
71. Press Release, Liberty Counsel, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Blocks California’s
Ban on Change Therapy (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?PID=14100&PRID
=1266.
72. Denny Walsh & Sam Stanton, Battle Over Ban on ‘Gay Therapy,’ SACRAMENTO
BEE, Dec. 17, 2012 at 1A.
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PJI President Brad Dacus publically proclaimed that his organization
stands ready in Welch “‘to fight this battle all the way to the Supreme
Court, if necessary.’” 73 On the other side of the battle in Pickup, Cali-
fornia Attorney General Kamala Harris vowed to vigorously defend
the law in the face of the Ninth Circuit’s emergency injunction.74
It is far from easy to tell what the ultimate result in the case
will be as it plays out before the Ninth Circuit and possibly the
Supreme Court. As legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin observed:
What makes this case so hard is that the therapy is speech. It’s
easy to regulate giving injections or doing surgery, because ob-
viously, there’s no speech component to that. But medical treat-
ment that is by the use of speech, includes both free speech and
the practice of medicine, and that’s what the state of California,
they tried to navigate here.75
The implications may stretch far beyond California, with U.S.
Rep. Jackie Speier, a California Democrat, introducing in November
2012 a “Stop Harming Our Kids Resolution” denouncing SOCE.76
Furthermore, two New Jersey bills that would ban SOCE on minors
in the Garden State were pending in early 2013.77
In both Welch and Pickup, the First Amendment freedom of
speech is caught in the cross-hairs of an apparent cultural, political
and religious war.78 At the micro level, that war centers on SOCE.
At the macro level, however, it pivots on the tolerance and accep-
tance—or lack thereof—of homosexuality in the United States.79
73. Eckholm, Clashing Rulings, supra note 31.
74. See King, supra note 69 (quoting Lynda Gledhill, Kamala Harris’s press secre-
tary, for the proposition that “ ‘California was correct to outlaw this unsound and harm-
ful practice, and the attorney general will vigorously defend this law’” ).
75. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast Dec. 4, 2012) (transcript
available on LexisNexis Academic database).
76. H.R. Res. 141, 112th Cong. (2012). The resolution provides, in relevant part, that
“[i]t is the sense of Congress that sexual orientation and gender identity or expression
change efforts directed at minors are discredited and ineffective, have no legitimate ther-
apeutic purpose, and are dangerous and harmful.” Id. at sec. 2(a); see Cheryl Wetzstein,
Congress Implored to Denounce Sexual-Orientation Therapy, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012,
at A1 (reporting on the resolution).
77. A.B. 3371, 215th Leg. 2012 Sess. (N.J. 2012–2013); S.B. 2278, 215th Leg. 2012
Sess. (N.J. 2012–2013).
78. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2012); see also Pickup
v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
79. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSO-
CIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION
92 (2009) [hereinafter APA Report], available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources
/therapeutic-response.pdf (“The debate surrounding SOCE has become mired in ideo-
logical disputes and competing political agendas . . . . Other policy concerns involve
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Specifically, the second decade of the twenty-first century is a cru-
cial period, with the nation’s high court poised in 2013 to consider
the validity of the Defense of Marriage Act80 and California’s Propo-
sition 8,81 both of which affect same-sex marriage.
This Article wades into these choppy constitutional waters to
explore more fully the First Amendment interests and issues at
stake in Welch and Pickup. The Article does so through the lens of
traditional free speech theories rather than simply via free speech
doctrines such as strict scrutiny and rational basis review that are,
after all, designed to implement the objectives attributed to free
speech theories.82 If two judges considering the exact same statute
in just two days cannot even agree on the threshold question of
whether First Amendment speech interests are at stake in conver-
sion therapy, much less whether strict scrutiny or rational basis
review should apply, then it seems important to take a step back to
analyze how free speech theories may or may not support those
individuals and groups now challenging California’s ban on SOCE
for minors.
religious or socially conservative agendas where issues of religious morality conflict with
scientif ic-based conceptions of positive and healthy development.” ).
80. As codif ied, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) provides in relevant part that
“the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is
a husband or a wife.” 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). The case the Supreme Court chose to hear
involving DOMA is United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). See Questions
Presented, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/12-00307qp.pdf (iden-
tifying the questions presented in Windsor on which certiorari was granted, including
whether DOMA “violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the
laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of
their State”).
81. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see Questions Presented, U.S.
SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/12-00144qp.pdf (identifying the two
questions on which certiorari was granted in Hollingsworth as “[w]hether the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State of California from
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman,” and “[w]hether petitioners have
standing under Article III, §2 of the Constitution in this case”); see also Adam Liptak,
Justices to Hear Two Challenges on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2012, at A1
(reporting that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in December 2012 that “it would en-
ter the national debate over same-sex marriage, agreeing to hear a pair of cases chal-
lenging state and federal laws that def ine marriage to include only unions of a man and
a woman”); David G. Savage, Gay Marriage Goes to Justices, BALT. SUN, Dec. 8, 2012,
at 5A (reporting that the Supreme Court in December 2012 agreed to “hear appeals of
decisions striking down California’s gay marriage ban and the federal law denying benefits
for legally married couples”).
82. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (“First Amendment doctrine veers between
theory and the exigencies of specif ic cases. The function of doctrine is both to implement
the objectives attributed by theory to the Constitution and to offer principled grounds of
justif ication for particular decisions.” ) (emphasis added).
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Part I of the Article includes two sections, initially providing
further background on the terms of California’s SOCE law and then
describing the legislative history behind it.83 Part II then examines,
in richer detail, the district court rulings in both Welch and Pickup,
focusing on the judges’ analyses of the purported free speech inter-
ests at stake in the twin cases.84 Next, Part III turns to the heart of
the Article, analyzing how both the enumerated right to speak and
the unenumerated right to receive speech85 in conversion therapy
settings are supported or hindered by what First Amendment
scholar Vincent Blasi dubs as a venerable “trilogy of rationales” 86
for free speech protection—the marketplace of ideas, democratic
self-governance and human dignity/autonomy.87 More specifically,
this part uses the SOCE issue to analyze the following research
question that assumes, arguendo, that SOCE involves not simply
conduct but, per Judge Shubb’s ruling,88 speech:
What level of proof should the government be required to satisfy
before ideas like SOCE, which purport to directly affect an in-
dividual’s interest in self-realization and human dignity89 while
simultaneously being bound up in larger political battles of
the day, amount to “empirically disprovable falsehoods” 90 and
83. Infra Parts I.A–B.
84. See infra notes 131–208 and accompanying text.
85. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (addressing the First Amend-
ment right to receive information); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(observing that “the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to
receive, [and] the right to read”) (emphasis added); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143 (1943) (asserting that the First Amendment “freedom embraces the right to dis-
tribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it” ) (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2012) (describ-
ing the “derivative” right to receive speech and calling it “well established”); Randall P.
Bezanson, Artifactual Speech, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 826 (2001) (asserting that a
minority view of the purpose of the First Amendment “rests on the premise that the
speech right belongs to the audience. This is the view articulated by the ‘right to receive
ideas’ school of First Amendment thought,” and adding that, in this view, the purpose
of the First Amendment “is to encourage the dissemination of information and views and
communicative stimuli to the audience, the viewers or receivers, or the public” ).
86. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the
Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61, 61 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
87. See infra Part III.
88. See infra Part II.A and accompanying text (describing Shubb’s ruling in Welch).
89. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (observing that
“freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulf illment. The
proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities a human being”).
90. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008).
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“demonstrably untrue” 91 notions such that they may be jetti-
soned via legislative action from the marketplace of ideas with-
out violating First Amendment interests in speech?
This issue is particularly ripe and relevant for scholarly analy-
sis based on a trio of reasons stemming from recent rulings by the
nation’s high court. First, the Supreme Court’s 2012 plurality opin-
ion in United States v. Alvarez made it clear that simply because
speech is false does not necessarily or automatically preclude it from
some level of First Amendment protection.92 This indicates that
even though SOCE may be false, at least in terms of what it prom-
ises for gay men, it might still be shielded from censorship by the
U.S. Constitution.
The second reason is the Supreme Court’s 2011 majority opin-
ion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association requiring a
direct causal relationship between speech and harm before speech
can be censored due to its content.93 It was a point reiterated by the
Alvarez plurality, with Justice Anthony Kennedy asserting that
“[t]here must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed
and the injury to be prevented.” 94 In light of free speech theories,
should this proof-of-causation doctrine apply when the speech takes
the form of counseling minors regarding the ability to change sex-
ual orientation?
The third reason, however, seems to conflict with the notions
that some false speech merits protection and that only a direct
causal connection between speech and harm justifies its censorship.
In particular, in the context of considering the constitutionality of
a federal statute affecting partial-birth abortion, the U.S. Supreme
Court observed in 2007 that “[t]he Court has given state and federal
legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there
is medical and scientific uncertainty.” 95 This clearly militates in
favor of California banning SOCE despite ongoing debate, at least
in some quarters, about its benefits or the lack thereof.
This Article does not pretend to definitively resolve the question
posed above. It does, however, attempt to bridge First Amendment
91. Id. at 3.
92. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546–47 (2012) (“As our law and tradi-
tion show, then, there are instances in which the falsity of speech bears upon whether
it is protected. Some false speech may be prohibited even if analogous true speech could
not be. This opinion does not imply that any of these targeted prohibitions are somehow
vulnerable. But it also rejects the notion that false speech should be in a general category
that is presumptively unprotected.” ) (emphasis added).
93. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–39 (2011).
94. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549.
95. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).
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theory with recent doctrinal rulings regarding protected-versus-
unprotected speech, using SOCE as an important and timely real
world issue to ground the theoretical discussion. Finally, Part IV
concludes by acknowledging and addressing some of the limitations
of this Article, as well as its efforts to link theory with doctrine.96
I. CALIFORNIA’S ANTI-SOCE LAW AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
This Part initially introduces the terms of California’s now-
enjoined SOCE law, including details about the types of treatments
it does and does not cover. It then describes some of the events that
gave rise to the law.
A. An Overview of California’s Anti-SOCE Law
Senate Bill 1172, now codified in sections of California’s Busi-
ness and Professions Code, defines SOCE as “any practices by
mental health providers that seek to change an individual’s sexual
orientation. This includes efforts to change behaviors or gender
expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions
or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” 97 The term “any
practices,” as addressed later, appears broad enough to sweep up
both pure speech in the form of counseling and physical treatment
such as electroshock therapy.98 Indeed, as mentioned in the Intro-
duction99 and as elaborated on in Part II of this Article, one federal
judge found the law regulated speech, while another determined it
prohibited only conduct.100
Despite this ambiguity, the California law makes clear the
serious repercussions facing mental health providers who flaunt it
by performing SOCE on individuals under the age of eighteen years.
Specifically, violations are classified as “unprofessional conduct”
and violators are subject “to discipline by the licensing entity for
that mental health provider.”101
96. See infra notes 214–317 and accompanying text.
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1(b)(1) (2013).
98. Elaine M. Maccio, Self-Reported Sexual Orientation and Identity Before and After
Sexual Reorientation Therapy, 15 J. GAY & LESBIAN MENTAL HEALTH 242, 243 (2011)
(noting that SOCE used in the past have included “aversion techniques, such as admin-
istering electric shock and nausea-inducing drugs,” and that SOCE now are “adminis-
tered primarily via psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy”).
99. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
100. See infra Part II.
101. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.2 (2013).
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Although the law eliminates SOCE therapies for minors, it al-
lows “licensed therapists [to] still talk with patients about their sex-
uality.”102 Specifically, the law provides that SOCE do not encompass:
psychotherapies that: (A) provide acceptance, support, and un-
derstanding of clients or the facilitation of clients’ coping, social
support, and identity exploration and development, including
sexual orientation–neutral interventions to prevent or address
unlawful conduct or unsafe sexual practices; and (B) do not seek
to change sexual orientation.103
When viewed collectively, these include-and-exclude provisions
make it apparent that while counseling designed to support and
facilitate a minor’s exploration of his or her sexual orientation is
permitted, counseling designed to thwart or change a minor’s explo-
ration of his or her sexual orientation is prohibited. Put more bluntly
and provocatively, speech in only one direction is permissible.
The restrictions placed upon therapists by Senate Bill 1172
immediately created controversy in the psychiatric community. For
instance, the American Psychiatric Association issued a position
statement in May 2000, in which it “recommends that ethical practi-
tioners refrain from attempts to change individuals’ sexual orienta-
tion, keeping in mind the medical dictum to First, [sic] do no harm.”104
Yet in July 2012, Rhea Farberman, an APA spokeswoman, told a
journalist that the APA “does not approve or ban” therapies and,
instead, leaves such decisions up to individual states.105 Mat Staver,
head of the Liberty Council, one of the organizations seeking to block
the law, deployed this distinction when conveying his views about
SOCE during an October 2012 interview with Senator Lieu on the
National Public Radio show, Tell Me More.106
Responding to Lieu’s assertion that the APA prohibits conver-
sion therapy, Staver insisted this was “absolutely incorrect” because
the APA only possesses the power to proffer suggestions for ethical
102. Kim Reyes, Bill Limits Gay Conversion Therapy, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 29,
2012, at A1.
103. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1(b)(2) (2013).
104. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON THERAPIES FOCUSED ON
ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE SEXUAL ORIENTATION (REPARATIVE OR CONVERSION THERAPIES):
SUPPLEMENT (May 2000), available at http://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Advocacy
%20and%20Newsroom/Position%20Statements/ps2000_ReparativeTherapy.pdf.
105. Reyes, supra note 102.
106. Tell Me More: Ca. Bans Therapy Meant to Turn Gay Kids Straight (National Pub-
lic Radio broadcast Oct. 4, 2012) (transcript available on LexisNexis Academic database)
[hereinafter Tell Me More] (providing an interview with Senator Ted Lieu and Mat Staver,
chairman of the Liberty Counsel).
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practices.107 The heated, on-air conversation between Staver and Lieu
demonstrates the ongoing strife surrounding the law’s mandates,
now under fire for alleged constitutional infringements. The law,
however, was controversial before it was enacted by the California
legislature and signed by Governor Jerry Brown.
The next section describes the events leading up to the bill’s
enactment, detailing the legislative and political lines separating
the constituencies in favor of and against the measure.
B. The Legislative History of Senate Bill 1172
In February 2012, Senator Ted Lieu introduced Senate Bill
1172, dubbed a “patient-protection plan.”108 At the time, the Southern
California Democrat asserted he drafted the measure “partly in re-
membrance” of abused victims of SOCE.109
Specifically, Lieu was convinced such therapy was “evil” after
“watch[ing] a show on television”110 in 2011—presumably Anderson
Cooper’s scathing CNN exposé on reparative therapy111—which dis-
cussed the story of Kirk Murphy, who went through so-called “sissy
boy experiments”112 as a youth and later committed suicide at age
thirty-eight.113 Such experiments refer to those performed by Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles’s Dr. George Rekers,114 who developed
“behavioral treatment procedures”115 meant to “[correct] pathologi-
cal gender identity development in boys.”116
In early 2012, a LGBT legislative advocacy group called Equality
California117 approached Lieu with an idea on reparative therapy, and
107. Id.
108. Press Release, Senator Ted W. Lieu, Senate Sends to Governor First-in-Nation
Crackdown on Bogus ‘Ex-gay Cures’ for Minors (Aug. 30, 2012), http://sd28.senate.ca
.gov/news/2012-08-30-senate-sends-governor-f irst-nation-crackdown-bogus-%E2%80
%98ex-gay-cures-minors.
109. Id.; Cheryl Wetzstein, Lawsuit Filed vs. Calif. Ban on Change-Gays Therapy,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at A6 (quoting Lieu as stating “[s]ome victims, such as Kirk
Murphy, committed suicide. . . . This law is partly in remembrance of Kirk”).
110. Tell Me More, supra note 106.
111. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast Jun. 7, 2011) (transcript
available on LexisNexis Academic database).
112. Tell Me More, supra note 106.
113. Sarah Anne Hughes, Family of Kirk Murphy Says ‘Sissy Boy’ Experiment Led to
His Suicide, WASH. POST ( June 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost
/post/family-of-kirk-murphy-says-sissy-boy-experiment-led-to-his-suicide/2011/06/10
/AGYfgvOH_blog.html.
114. Id.
115. George Rekers et al., The Behavioral Treatment of a “Transsexual” Preadolescent
Boy, 2 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 99, 99 (1974).
116. Id. at 100.
117. See About Us, EQUALITY CALIFORNIA, http://www.eqca.org/site/pp.asp?c=kuLRJ9
MRKrH&b=4025493 ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (describing Equality California as “[t]he
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he “jumped at the opportunity to carry the bill.”118 Senate Bill 1172
received support from its inception, drawing other cosponsors as well
as backing from gay-friendly organizations.119
Despite the contention that the bill potentially conflicted with
another California statute,120 Senate Bill 1172 gained immediate
popularity in the California legislature.121 Its controversial nature
quickly became obvious, however, as the issue split cleanly along
partisan lines. Votes throughout the bill’s senate and assembly hear-
ings reflect a clear rift, with 100 percent of Democrats voting in its
favor and a unified opposition from Republicans.122
Externally, this distinction was not so obvious. The bill encoun-
tered instant backlash from some organizations that later found
themselves jumping the fence from the oppositional field to join the
supporting forces. The California Psychological Association (CPA),
for instance, originally believed the “bill would micromanage the work
of individual therapists,” rejected the initial breadth of its language,
and, thus, would not back it unless amended.123 Several months into
largest statewide LGBT advocacy organization in California working to secure full and last-
ing equality for and acceptance of LGBT people. Over the past decade, Equality California
has partnered with social justice advocates, businesses, grassroots supporters and legis-
lative leaders to strategically move California from a state with extremely limited legal pro-
tections for LGBT people to a state with some of the most comprehensive human rights
protections in the nation”).
118. Tell Me More, supra note 106.
119. See Ted W. Lieu, Senate Bill 1172 Sexual Orientation Change ‘Therapy’ Fact
Sheet, available at http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/sites/sd28.senate.ca.gov/f iles/SB%201172
%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Lieu Fact Sheet].
120. See Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012)
(“During committee hearings, the Legislature addressed a potential conflict with California
Health & Safety Code § 124260, which allows minors who are twelve years of age or
older to consent to mental health treatments without parental approval. The Legislature
ultimately concluded that Section 124260 was meant to allow minors to access only helpful
treatment and thus that SB 1172’s goal of protecting minors from harmful treatment
was not in conflict.” ).
121. See Activity Votes for SB 1172, OPEN STATES CALIFORNIA, http://openstates.org/ca
/bills/20112012/SB1172/ (listing vote results by dates, including: 1) April 23, 2012 Senate:
five Democratic “yes” votes and three Republican “no” votes; 2) May 8, 2012 Senate: three
Democratic “yes” votes and two Republican “no” votes; 3) May 30, 2012 Senate: twenty-
three Democratic “yes” votes and thirteen Republican “no” votes; 4) June 26, 2012 As-
sembly: six Democratic “yes” votes and two Republican “no” votes; 5) July 5, 2012 Assem-
bly: fifty-three Democratic “yes” votes and twenty-five Republican “no” votes; 6) August 8,
2012 Assembly: twelve Democratic “yes” votes and f ive Republican “no” votes; and 7)
August 30, 2012 Senate: twenty-three Democratic “yes” votes and thirteen Republican
“no” votes).
122. Id.
123. Healing Arts: Sexual Orientation Change Efforts Hearing on SB 1172 Before the
Comm. on Business, Professions and Economic Development, 2012 Leg. 9 (Cal. 2012),
available at http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/sites/sd28.senate.ca.gov/f iles/SB%201172%20Sen
%20B&P%20Analysis.pdf.
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the legislative process, however, the CPA shifted its support in favor
of Senate Bill 1172, assisting Senator Lieu with revisions.124
Following these amendments, several organizations that once
teetered as to their support finally tipped in favor of the bill.125 The
California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists (CAMFT)
explained that it reversed its initial rejection of Senate Bill 1172
after the measure underwent “many amendments and iterations,
including criminal sanctions, informed consent requirements, re-
strictions on higher education teachings, cause of action language,
and unprofessional conduct ramifications.”126
The opposition—driven primarily by religious and moral promo-
tional goals127—was wary of Senate Bill 1172’s First Amendment
implications from its inception, deeming it “one of the most . . .
speech-chilling bills . . . ever seen in California.”128 Unlike the con-
cerns originally voiced by the CPA or CAMFT, which were addressed
by amendments, it was not until after Governor Brown signed the
measure into law that the First Amendment issues were forced to
the judicial forefront.
The next Part of this Article analyzes the two district court
opinions, Welch v. Brown and Pickup v. Brown, that came down on
opposite sides of the free speech argument and that expose the under-
lying ideological rifts associated with categorizing SOCE as either
conduct or speech.
II. CONFLICTING DISTRICT COURT RULINGS IN WELCH
AND PICKUP: AN OVERVIEW
This Part summarizes the December 2012 opinions in Welch v.
Brown and Pickup v. Brown that were handed down within a 24-
hour span by different federal judges in the Eastern District of
California. The conclusions in Welch and Pickup are remarkably
124. Press Release, Cal. Psychological Ass’n, California Psychological Association Voices
Support for SB 1172 (Lieu) Banning the Use of Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (SOCE)
with Minors (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.cpapsych.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&sub
articlenbr=393.
125. Lieu Fact Sheet, supra note 119.
126. Legislative Update, CA. ASSOC. MARRIAGE & FAMILY THERAPISTS (June 12, 2012),
http://www.camft.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay
.cfm&ContentID=12312.
127. See Lieu Fact Sheet, supra note 119 ( listing opposition to SB 1172 to including
organizations, such as Catholic Medical Association, Church State Council, NARTH, etc.).
128. Press Release, Pac. Justice Inst., Bill Seeks to Limit Counseling Against Gay
Attraction; Are Parents Next Target? (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.pacif icjustice.org/1
/post/2012/04/bill-seeks-to-limit-counseling-against-gay-attraction-are-parents-next
-target.html.
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different, first as to whether SOCE should be categorized as speech
or conduct and, second, as to the appropriate standard of judicial
review—strict scrutiny or rational basis—for measuring the validity
of California’s anti-SOCE law.
Section A below addresses the opinion in Welch, while Section B
analyzes the decision in Pickup. Specifically, these sections con-
centrate on the First Amendment speech interests asserted in those
cases by mental health providers, rather than on the interests as-
serted by patients, prospective patients, or the parents of patients.129
Subsequent to these twin rulings, on December 21, 2012 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs’
emergency motion for an injunction in Pickup, stopping enforcement
of the law until it could hear the case.130 Argument before the Ninth
Circuit was slated to occur the week of April 15, 2013.131
A. Welch v. Brown
On October 1, 2012, a trio of plaintiffs—a therapist, a psychia-
trist, and a patient132—filed suit133 to stop California from enforcing
its law prohibiting medical health professionals from administering
SOCE to minors.134 Lead plaintiff Donald W. Welch, a licensed
marriage and family therapist and an ordained minister for the
Skyline Church in southern California,135 claimed the statute was
129. See infra note 189 and accompanying text (noting that in Pickup there were
several plaintiffs in addition to mental health providers).
130. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. App. WL 6869637 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012).
131. See Welch v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 496382, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“The
Ninth Circuit has set an expedited brief ing schedule and the appeal is set to be heard
the week of April 15, 2013, along with the appeal in the case of Pickup v. Brown.” ).
132. The plaintiffs are: 1) Donald Welch, a licensed marriage and family therapist in
California and an ordained minister with the Skyline Wesleyan Church; 2) Anthony
Duk, a medical doctor and board certif ied psychiatrist who works with patients includ-
ing minors “struggling with” homosexuality and bisexuality; and 3) Aaron Bitzer, an
adult who once underwent SOCE and who now plans “on becoming a therapist specif -
ically to work with individuals having same-sex attractions and to help men like him-
self.” Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
133. Complaint at ¶¶ 1–3, Welch v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4762008 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 02-484) [hereinafter Welch Complaint].
134. Id. ¶ 142. The lawsuit sought to enjoin the SOCE law, which was signed by Gov-
ernor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown, Jr., on September 29, 2012, before it was to take effect
on January 1, 2013.
135. Id. ¶ 1. On the website for Family Consultation Services, which Welch now owns
and directs, Welch writes:
I have been counseling couples, families, and individuals in various settings
for approximately thirty years. As a California Licensed Marriage and Family
Therapist, ordained minister, professor, and President, Founder and CEO of
Enriching Relationships, Inc. (a biblically-based research and professional
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unconstitutional and that compliance with it would jeopardize his
employment.136 Specifically, Welch and fellow plaintiffs Anthony
Duk and Aaron Bitzer asserted “violations of their rights to freedom
of speech under the First Amendment.”137
Among other things, the complaint alleges that California’s
anti-SOCE law not only constitutes a content-based restriction on
speech, but also:
is viewpoint-based in that it does not purport to ban all profes-
sional speech toward minors concerning sexual orientation, same-
sex attraction, or gender expression, but only at such speech that
is deemed “change efforts” and not affirming or supportive. Thus,
the distinction in the statute rests on the speaker’s viewpoints of
sexual orientation, same-sex attraction, and gender expression.138
The plaintiffs’ argument here amounts to playing the First
Amendment trump card because viewpoint-based restrictions on
expression are anathema under free speech jurisprudence. As Duke
Law School Professor Joseph Blocher recently observed, “The first
rule of free speech theory and doctrine is that the government may
not discriminate against a particular viewpoint based simply on its
disagreement with that viewpoint.”139 Saint Louis University Pro-
fessor Dan Kozlowski points out that while the U.S. Supreme Court
“has devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral regu-
lations (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient
counseling seminar company), and owner/director of Family Consultation
Services, Inc. I frequently speak about relationship issues at churches, con-
ferences, retreats, and seminars throughout the United States. I have worked
as a family therapist staff member at Charter Behavioral Health System of
Kansas City, a psychiatric hospital where substance abuse and addictions
were treated utilizing Alcoholics Anonymous, 12-Step programming, medical
pharmacological balancing, and mental health care. I frequently work di-
rectly with psychiatrists, physicians, pastors, counselors, teachers and other
care-givers while treating my patients.
Meet Our Therapists, FAMILY COUNSELING SERVS., http://www.fcssandiego.com/donald
.html ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014); see Christopher Cadelago, S.D. Pastor Contesting Ban
on Therapy for Gay Youths, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 3, 2012, at A-10 (describing
Welch as a San Diego pastor and the Skyline Church as “one of the oldest Christian
counseling centers in the area”).
136. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Specif ically, according to Welch,
his church teaches that “human sexuality . . . is to be expressed only in a monogamous life-
long relationship between one man and one woman with the framework of marriage.” Id.
137. Id. at 1102.
138. Welch Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 83–84.
139. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV.
695, 703 (2011).
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intermediate scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral) . . .
it has said that viewpoint-based regulations are unconstitutional.”140
Because the California statute subjects them to professional dis-
cipline if they engage in SOCE with minors, the plaintiffs assert that
it “intentionally and actually chills speech.”141 Furthermore, because
the plaintiffs espouse views that conflict with the statute’s terms,
the plaintiffs contend “they are . . . in imminent danger of state-
sanctioned punishment for [their] First Amendment expression.”142
On December 3, 2012, Senior U.S. District Judge William Shubb
issued a preliminary injunction in the plaintiffs’ favor, holding the
law may inhibit the First Amendment rights of therapists.143 Shubb
practiced First Amendment law before joining the bench144 and for-
merly served for seven years as chief judge in the Eastern District
before assuming senior status in November 2004.145
In temporarily blocking the law’s application as to the three
plaintiffs, Shubb weighed what he called the public’s “interest in the
protection and mental well-being of minors”146 against “the public’s
interest in preserving First Amendment rights.”147 He ultimately
had “no difficulty in concluding that protecting an individual’s First
Amendment rights outweighs the public’s interest in rushing to
enforce an unprecedented law.”148
Before reaching this pro–free speech result, however, Judge
Shubb first considered and rejected two key arguments made by
California regarding the doctrinal rules he should apply to analyze
the validity of the law.149 Specifically, California contended its anti-
SOCE statute was not subject to the rigorous strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review150 because the measure: a) constitutes “a regulation
of professional conduct;”151 and b) “regulates conduct, not speech.”152
As to the first argument, Judge Shubb acknowledged that
“some courts have . . . applied a lower level of review to professional
140. Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget
Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131–32 (2008) (emphasis added).
141. Welch Complaint, supra note 133, ¶ 86.
142. Id. ¶ 88.
143. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1121–23 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis added).
144. Denny Walsh, Gay ‘Conversion’ Ban Put on Hold, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 4, 2012,
at 3A.
145. See Senior District Court Judge William B. Shubb (WBS), E. DIST. CAL., http://
www.caed.uscourts.gov/caed/staticOther/page_510.htm ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
146. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1109–12.
150. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny).
151. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
152. Id. at 1111.
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regulations addressing the speech of a professional.”153 However,
Shubb cited Ninth Circuit precedent for his own conclusion that “a
content- or viewpoint-based professional regulation is subject to
strict scrutiny”154 and that “even if [Senate Bill] 1172 is viewed as
a professional regulation, it is subject to strict scrutiny if it is
content- or viewpoint-based.”155
Regarding whether the statute regulates conduct and not
speech, Judge Shubb opined that “[e]ven if SB 1172 is characterized
as primarily aimed at regulating conduct, it also extends to forms of
[sexual-orientation change efforts] that utilize speech and, at a
minimum, regulates conduct that has an incidental impact upon
speech.”156 On this point, he reasoned that “at least some forms of
SOCE, such as ‘talk therapy,’ involve speech and the Ninth Circuit
has stated that the ‘communication that occurs during psychoanal-
ysis is entitled to First Amendment protection.’”157 Shubb added
that the plaintiffs “have indicated that they wish to engage in SOCE
through speech.”158
Having determined both that the law at issue involves speech
and that content-based restrictions imposed on the expression of
professionals, including mental health providers, are subject to strict
scrutiny, Judge Shubb then faced the critical question of whether
California’s law is content based or content neutral. Shubb wrote that
he would be “hard-pressed to conclude that SB 1172 is content- and
viewpoint-neutral.”159 He reasoned that the measure:
draws a line in the sand governing a therapy session and the
moment that the mental health provider’s speech “seek[s] to
change an individual’s sexual orientation,” including a patient’s
behavior, gender expression, or sexual or romantic attractions
or feelings toward individuals of the same sex, the mental health
provider can no longer speak.160
The judge added that the personal viewpoints of the plaintiffs on
homosexuality are also restricted by the law because “messages
about homosexuality can be inextricably intertwined with SOCE.”161
153. Id. at 1110.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1111.
156. Id. at 1112.
157. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002)).
158. Id. at 1113.
159. Id. at 1117.
160. Id. at 1115.
161. Id. at 1117.
2014] CONVERSION THERAPY AND FREE SPEECH 549
Viewed collectively, these observations not surprisingly led Judge
Shubb to conclude that the California law likely “must ultimately be
assessed under strict scrutiny.”162
In determining whether California’s anti-SOCE law would pass
this level of judicial review, Shubb relied heavily on Brown v. Enter-
tainment Merchants Association, a 2011 Supreme Court opinion that
struck down a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video
games and analyzed the alleged effects of such games on minors.163
In Brown, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority that strict
scrutiny was “a demanding standard”164 that required California
both to identify an “actual problem in need of solving”165 and to
prove a “direct causal link”166 between playing violent video games
and harm suffered by minors. As Scalia wrote, “ambiguous proof
will not suffice.”167 Thus, without unambiguous evidence of direct
causation of harm, California would not be able to demonstrate the
requisite “compelling interest”168 under strict scrutiny to support its
video-game statute.
Applying this standard, the Brown majority struck down the
law because, in part, the studies offered to support it could “show at
best some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment
and minuscule real-world effects.”169 Highlighting the pivotal dis-
tinction between causation and correlation, Justice Scalia added
that California’s studies did “not prove that violent video games
cause minors to act aggressively.”170
Deploying this rigorous version of strict scrutiny from Brown,171
Judge Shubb determined that California had demonstrated only
that “SOCE may cause harm to minors.”172 In reaching this determi-
nation, he scrutinized173 the scientific data available to and reviewed
by the American Psychological Association in its 2009 “Report of
the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate
162. Id.
163. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
164. Id. at 2738.
165. Id. at 2730.
166. Id. at 2738.
167. Id. at 2739.
168. Id. at 2738.
169. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. See R. George Wright, Judicial Line-Drawing and the Broader Culture: The Case
of Politics and Entertainment, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341, 344–45 (2012) (characterizing
Brown’s approach as “a highly demanding strict scrutiny test” that leads to a “rigorous
application of strict scrutiny”).
172. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 1119–20.
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Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation.”174 Shubb cited the
following passage from the report to support the injunction against
the law:
We conclude that there is a dearth of scientifically sound re-
search on the safety of SOCE. Early and recent research studies
provide no clear indication of the prevalence of harmful outcomes
among people who have undergone efforts to change their sexual
orientation or the frequency of occurrence of harm because no
study to date of adequate scientific rigor has been explicitly de-
signed to do so. Thus, we cannot conclude how likely it is that
harm will occur from SOCE. However, studies from both periods
indicate that attempts to change sexual orientation may cause or
exacerbate distress and poor mental health in some individuals,
including depression and suicidal thoughts.175
In addition, while the California statute at issue in Welch
prohibited SOCE from being performed on minors, Judge Shubb
emphasized that “the studies discussed and criticized as incomplete
in the 2009 APA Report do not appear to have focused on harms to
minors.”176 He opined that it was “unclear whether the reports of
harm referenced in the 2009 APA Report were made exclusively by
adults.”177 In summary, for Judge Shubb there simply was not
sufficient evidence of harm to minors to justify the anti-SOCE law.
Turning next to the public policy implications of enjoining the
law in the face of growing public acceptance of gay rights, Shubb
borrowed language from a 2000 U.S. Supreme Court opinion:
That public perception in favor of this law may be heightened
because “it appears that homosexuality has gained greater so-
cietal acceptance . . . is scarcely an argument for denying First
Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these
views. The First Amendment protects expression, be it of popu-
lar variety or not.”178
In granting a preliminary injunction until he could have more
time to make a broader ruling on the merits, Shubb believed that
deciding the constitutional implications of this law outweighed the
costs of not having it enforced immediately.179
174. See APA Report, supra note 79.
175. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (quoting APA Report, supra note 79, at 42
(emphasis added)).
176. Id. (referring to APA Report, supra note 79).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1122 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000)).
179. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Although the ruling was a setback for the law’s supporters, the
Judge softened the impact of his decision by holding that the injunc-
tion applied only to the three plaintiffs—Welch, Duk and Bitzer.180
Nonetheless, PJI asserted that Shubb’s ruling might keep licensing
boards that regulate mental-health professionals from targeting
other practitioners.181 “ ‘We know we will have to have another hear-
ing on the merits, but to be able to get a preliminary injunction at
this stage is very telling as to the final outcome, and I’m very en-
couraged by it,’” said PJI President Brad Dacus.182 On the other
hand, Shannon Minter, director of the National Center for Lesbian
Rights, asserted that her organization was “‘confident that as the
case progresses, it will be clear to the court that this law is funda-
mentally no different than many other laws that regulate health
care professionals to protect patients.’”183
In February 2013, Judge Shubb granted Governor Brown and
California’s motion to stay the case pending the outcome of the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the case of Pickup v. Brown, which is dis-
cussed below.184
B. Pickup v. Brown
Just one day after Welch and only several chambers down the
hall in Sacramento,185 U.S. District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller ruled
that the law did not infringe on mental health providers’ constitu-
tional guarantee of free speech.186 It certainly was a high-profile
ruling for Mueller,187 who joined the federal bench fewer than two
years prior, after working in private practice and serving as a mem-
ber of the Sacramento City Council.188
180. Welch v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 496382, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb, 7, 2013).
181. Lisa Leff, Judge Temporarily Blocks Calif. Gay Therapy Law, ASSOC. PRESS
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/04/judge-blocks-calif
-gay-therapy-law/1744773/.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Welch, WL 496382 at *1.
185. Both Judge Shubb and Judge Mueller work in the Sacramento Division of the
Eastern District of California. See Judge Information, E. DIST. CAL., http://www.caed
.uscourts.gov/caed/staticOther/page_498.htm ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
186. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *24–26 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
187. Her name appeared in relation to her Pickup ruling in newspapers across the
country. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Decision on Gay ‘Conversion Therapy’ Depends on Other
Rulings, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A41; Cheryl Wetzstein, Ban on Gay-to-Straight
Therapy for Children Halted, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, at A6.
188. District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller (KJM), E. DIST. CAL., http://www.caed.uscourts
.gov/caed/staticOther/page_1563.htm ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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The plaintiffs in Pickup are four licensed health professionals;
two minors, who are patients of one of the mental health professionals,
along with the minors’ parents; the National Association for Research
and Therapy of Homosexuality; and a professional association of
Christian counselors.189 Judge Mueller distilled the free speech ar-
gument of the mental health providers down to the assertion that
the law “violates plaintiff therapists’ rights by discriminating based
on viewpoint and/or content.”190 In refusing to grant the injunction,
Judge Mueller rejected the argument that Senate Bill 1172 uncon-
stitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint or content,
finding instead that “the SOCE therapy regulated by SB 1172 is
conduct.”191 In brief, she cut the First Amendment argument off at
its knees by playing on the speech-conduct dichotomy.
Although Mueller acknowledged that the First Amendment
sometimes protects expressive conduct that amounts to symbolic
expression,192 she distinguished those cases193 from the one at hand,
thereby avoiding much of the First Amendment analysis. To support
her argument, she relied on several other court decisions, finding
that the provision of healthcare of other forms of treatment was not
expressive conduct.194 Citing another court’s opinion, Mueller wrote:
“‘Giving or receiving health care is not a statement in the same
sense as wearing a black armband or burning a flag.’”195
Thus, in direct opposition to Judge Shubb’s decision, Mueller
wrote that the therapists in this case had “not shown that the treat-
ment, the end product of which is a change of behavior, is expressive
conduct entitled to First Amendment protection.”196 “The state’s in-
sistence that the statute bars treatment only, and not the mention
of [the treatment] or a referral to a religious counselor or out-of-
state practitioner,” Mueller wrote, “is consistent with a fair reading
189. Pickup, WL 6021465, at *1.
190. Id. at *7.
191. Id. at *9.
192. For instance, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor observed, in recognizing cross
burning as a type of speech, that “the First Amendment protects symbolic conduct as
well as pure speech.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 n.2 (2003). First Amendment
scholar Rodney Smolla refers to this as “the symbolism principle.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 48 (1993).
193. See Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012)
(citing cases such as the flag-burning decision of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
and the upside-down-hung, peace-symbol-aff ixed flag case of Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974)).
194. Pickup, WL 6021465, at *10.
195. Id. (citing O’Brien v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2012 WL
4481208, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012)).
196. Pickup, WL 6021465, at *10.
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of the statute itself.”197 According to Mueller, the Supreme Court
has approved legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emo-
tional well-being of young people, “even when the laws have oper-
ated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.”198 For
instance, Mueller noted that minors and their parents have viable
alternatives to SOCE treatment, and California providers are able
to refer patients to counselors not covered by the measure.199
In determining the standard to be applied, Mueller thus noted
that “[a]s SOCE therapy is subject to the state’s legitimate control
over the professions, [Senate Bill] 1172’s restrictions on therapy do
not implicate fundamental rights and are not properly evaluated
under strict scrutiny review, but rather under the rational basis
test.” 200 Because this level of judicial review only requires the gov-
ernment to present a legitimate “reason for acting as it did,” Mueller
found that Senate Bill 1172 did, indeed, pass muster.201 Although
the First Amendment may be implicated in the regulation of speech
between a doctor and a patient, the Supreme Court has allowed the
government to burden a child’s right to free speech in the creation
of “legislation aimed at protecting [their] physical and emotional
well-being.” 202 Here, the government’s interest in the well-being of
children “exist[ed] apart from the government’s interest in support-
ing parents’ efforts to protect their children.” 203 Thus, for Mueller,
“the court need not engage in an exercise of legislative mind reading
to find the California Legislature and the state’s Governor could
have had a legitimate reason for enacting SB 1172.” 204
In late January 2013, Judge Mueller granted the joint motion
of the parties in Pickup to stay the case until the Ninth Circuit
could resolve the constitutional questions upon hearing the case in
April 2013.205
197. Id. at 9.
198. Id. at 12 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982)).
199. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982)).
203. Pickup, WL 6021465, at *12.
204. Id. at *26.
205. Pickup v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 411474 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013). In
granting the stay, Judge Mueller reasoned there was
no indication that a stay pending resolution of the preliminary injunction
appeal would harm any of the parties, especially because they have jointly
requested the stay. Moreover, because the preliminary injunction appeal
will resolve issues related to the constitutionality of SB 1172 that this court
will need to address in order to move forward, it will achieve eff iciencies to
await the outcome of the Ninth Circuit proceedings.
Id. at *1.
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Falling in line with decisive division apparent in the legislative
context, the split in these opinions falls likewise along party lines.
As noted in the Introduction, Judges Shubb and Mueller were ap-
pointed by a Republican president and a Democratic president, respec-
tively.206 Party loyalty aside, it ultimately seems as if the outcome in
each case is largely determined by whether SOCE is characterized
as conduct or speech.
With this background on Welch and Pickup in mind, the next
Part assumes, for the sake of argument, that SOCE is speech in order
to address the central question posed in the Introduction through the
lens of both First Amendment doctrine and theory.207
III. BRIDGING FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE & THEORY IN THE
DEBATE OVER BANNING SOCE FOR MINORS: AN INITIAL
FORAY TO PROBLEMATIZE THE ISSUES
This Part addresses the research question posed in the Intro-
duction208 by attempting to bridge the gap between doctrine and the-
ory as they relate to California’s anti-SOCE law. It features three
sections. Initially, Section A delves into a trio of Supreme Court
rulings—Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,209 United
States v. Alvarez210 and Gonzalez v. Carhart211—that provide possible
doctrines for measuring the validity of California’s law. Section B
then analyzes California’s law in light of three influential theories
of free speech: the marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance
and human dignity/autonomy. Next, Section C attempts to synthesize
the doctrines and theories, although it makes no pretense of resolv-
ing the complex questions the Ninth Circuit must now address.
Given the clear split of authority between the district court
rulings in Welch and Pickup described earlier,212 as well as the fact
206. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (setting forth the research question).
208. As framed in the Introduction, the research question, which assumes that SOCE
constitutes speech, is:
What level of proof should the government be required to satisfy before
ideas like SOCE, which purport to directly affect an individual’s interest in
self-realization and human dignity while simultaneously being bound up in
larger political battles of the day, amount to “empirically disprovable false-
hoods” and “demonstrably untrue” notions such that they may be jettisoned
via legislative action from the marketplace of ideas without violating First
Amendment interests in speech?
Supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
209. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
210. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
211. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
212. See supra Part II.
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that the issues are now pending in the Ninth Circuit (and might
well eventually reach the Supreme Court), such a macro-level effort
to link theory and doctrine seems both timely and relevant.
A. Supreme Court Doctrine: A Trio of Potentially Key Cases
The Introduction identified three recent high court rulings that
might supply relevant doctrine for the Ninth Circuit to apply to the
anti-SOCE controversy in Welch and Pickup. Each section below
briefly explains the doctrines in those cases and relates them to the
issue of conversion therapy.
1. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association:
Proving Direct Causation of Harm
As described in Part II, the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association213 involved a Califor-
nia law regulating the sale of violent video games to minors.214 Not-
ing the unlikelihood that such a content-based restriction would ever
be permissible,215 the majority applied the “demanding standard” 216
of strict scrutiny to hold that California failed to offer evidence prov-
ing the requisite compelling interest.217 As opposed to the decision
in Carhart discussed below, the Court in Brown rejected California’s
assertion that it did not need to prove a “direct causal link” between
minors’ violent video game exposure and the alleged harm because
of the legislature’s “predictive judgment that such a link exists.” 218
Despite the numerous scientific studies offered to demonstrate nega-
tive effects of violent games on minors, the Court held that California
had not identified an “‘actual problem’ in need of solving” 219—which,
213. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732 (2011).
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1 (West 2011).
215. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). The Court noted
that although there are exceptions, “[t]he Free Speech Clause exists principally to pro-
tect discourse on public matters” and that “ ‘as a general matter, . . . government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). The Brown Court
found that California’s law did “not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of un-
protected speech to ensure that a def inition designed for adults is not uncritically
applied to children.” Id. at 2735.
216. Id. at 2738.
217. Id. at 2738–39 (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected
speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—
that is, unless it is justif ied by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn
to serve that interest.” ).
218. Id. at 2738.
219. Id.
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according to the majority, required that the “curtailment of free
speech must be actually necessary to the solution.” 220
The Brown majority found that the social science evidence was
not compelling enough—that it did not possess the “high degree of
necessity” required221—to demonstrate the games caused minors to
act aggressively.222 Thus, the Court held that California’s evidence
demonstrated, at best, a correlation—not causation—between the
games and harm to minors.223
The decision, however, left open both the type of evidence and
the amount of evidence necessary for California to prove harm to
minors. Regarding Brown, one law journal article asserts that:
When it comes to the relevance of social science data in supporting
a compelling interest to restrict free speech rights, a f ive-justice
majority of the Court in Brown adopted an extremely rigorous
standard that demands both causation and certitude, as well as
large effects that actually possess real-world significance.224
Indeed, Justice Samuel Alito questioned in his dissent whether the
standard endorsed by the majority was too high, explaining the
“State must surmount a formidable (and perhaps insurmountable)
obstacle if it wishes to prevent children from purchasing the most
violent and depraved video games imaginable.” 225
In a recent article, University of Virginia Professor Frederick
Schauer notes the Brown Court’s dismissiveness of the empirical
evidence proffered by California.226 According to Schauer, “having
established such a heightened standard of justification it seems clear
that even substantially better empirical evidence than California,
in the majority’s view, was able to offer would still have been insuffi-
cient.” 227 In so doing, Schauer also questions whether the Court is
in the best position “to make proper use of sophisticated empirical
research.” 228 Ultimately, Schauer suggests that Brown raises many
220. Id.
221. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (2011).
222. Id. at 2739.
223. Id. 
224. Calvert, supra note 48, at 310.
225. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2747.
226. Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81,
92–93.
227. Id. at 93.
228. Id. at n.53. According to Professor Schauer:
Although everyone who is paying attention in Statistics 101 can parrot the
flaw of necessarily inferring causation from correlation, few of the studies
at issue suffered from that problem. Many had problems of construct and 
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questions regarding the evaluation of harm in First Amendment
jurisprudence: “What is the relevance of empirical social science
research, how should it be located, and by what standards should it
be evaluated?” 229 Despite such lingering issues, what was clear in
Brown, Schauer observes, is “that California could not even come
close to meeting such a high standard of justification.” 230
For now, the bottom line seems apparent—the harm doctrine
articulated in Brown imposes a very steep burden on California in
Welch and Pickup to support its anti-SOCE law. Under Brown, Cali-
fornia must demonstrate clear empirical proof that speech-based
SOCE therapy directly causes harm to minors.231 Whether the Ninth
Circuit chooses to apply Brown, however, remains to be seen. It
might be that the Ninth Circuit distinguishes Brown by confining
it to factual disputes involving harm purportedly caused by media
artifacts, not to situations involving spoken words in the form of
counseling. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit might conclude that
Brown does not apply in the context of a heavily regulated profes-
sion like medicine.
2. United States v. Alvarez: Protecting False Speech
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a portion of the Stolen Valor Act that made it a
crime to lie about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor and
other military honors.232 Justice Anthony Kennedy authored a plu-
rality opinion that announced the Court’s judgment233 striking down
the law after considering its First Amendment implications.
external validity, but a controlled laboratory experiment . . . is designed pre-
cisely to focus on causation. That does not, of course, mean that the causa-
tion located is necessarily relevant to the ultimate question . . .. [T]he ease
with which the Ninth Circuit and the Entertainment Merchants majority
accepted this questionable claim should give pause to those who would too
easily trust the Court to make proper use of sophisticated empirical research.
Id.
229. Id. at 110.
230. Id. at 93.
231. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–39 (2011).
232. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).  The section of the Stolen
Valor Act at issue in Alvarez provided that:
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have
been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to
the members of such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge,
decoration, or medal, or any colorable imitation of such item shall be f ined
under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2011).
233. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (noting that Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice
John Roberts and Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor).
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Of particular significance for this Article is Justice Kennedy’s
observation that “falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech
outside of the First Amendment” 234 and the plurality’s conclusion
“reject[ing] the notion that false speech should be in a general cat-
egory that is presumptively unprotected.” 235 This observation could
impact the law at issue in Welch and Pickup. It possibly could mean
that although SOCE may be false in terms of effectiveness for “curing”
gay men and women and false in terms of the theories about mutable
sexual orientation that underlie it, speech-based SOCE may none-
theless receive constitutional protection. Put more bluntly, the fact
that SOCE may be both a false speech-based therapy and a false
theory does not mean that it automatically is stripped of all First
Amendment protection.
It is unlikely that SOCE occurring through speech-based coun-
seling would be banned as a new category of unprotected expression.
The Court traditionally protects against content-based restrictions,
with the exception of certain “historically unprotected” 236 categories
of speech. These, as Justice Kennedy observed in Alvarez, include
“advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action,
obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called
‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech
presenting some grave and imminent threat the Government has
the power to prevent.” 237
In Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Government has
not demonstrated that false statements should constitute a new
category.” 238 Kennedy stressed that for the Court to exempt a new
category of speech from First Amendment protection, there must be
“persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a
long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.” 239 In the
case of the Stolen Valor Act, as with California’s anti-SOCE law,
there is no historical precedent for banning the false speech at issue.
As with similar cases, the recommended remedy of the plurality
in Alvarez against false speech is counter-speech.240 This same so-
lution arguably should be used by people objecting to SOCE, thus
avoiding the need for government regulation. Staging a public rela-
tions campaign, for instance, to educate the public about the alleged
234. Id. at 2545.
235. Id. at 2546–47.
236. Id. at 2540.
237. Id. at 2544 (internal citations omitted).
238. Id. at 2547.
239. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
240. Id. at 2549.
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harms and supposed dangers of SOCE on minors might be one
possible form of counter-speech.
Coupling Brown with Alvarez, it appears that California must
now demonstrate to the Ninth Circuit not only that SOCE is a false
therapy, but also that it directly causes harm to minors. Parsed col-
loquially, California needs to prove falseness plus dangerousness.
Significantly, the Court in Alvarez reiterated and deployed Brown’s
rigorous proof-of-causation doctrine, with Justice Kennedy writing
that “[t]here must be a direct causal link between the restriction
imposed and the injury to be prevented.” 241 This indicates that
Brown’s causation standard may not be so easily distinguished by
the Ninth Circuit in Welch and Pickup as only applicable to cases
involving media artifacts like video games.
3. Gonzales v. Carhart: Medical Uncertainty & Politicization
While Alvarez and Brown might well provide doctrinal precedent
for deeming California’s SOCE law unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Carhart provides ample support for the
California legislature’s actions. As noted in the Introduction, Carhart
examined the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of
2003.242 Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the majority opinion
upholding the Act.243
The majority reasoned Congress had “wide discretion” to pass
the Act because there are areas of “medical and scientific uncer-
tainty” about “whether the Act creates significant health risks for
women.” 244 Justice Kennedy cited for support the Court’s 1974 rul-
ing in Marshall v. United States in which it determined that “[w]hen
Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and sci-
entific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.” 245 This
language has, in turn, been interpreted to stand for the proposition
that judicial deference must be given to legislative bodies when
“difficult social, political, and medical issues are involved.” 246 SOCE,
of course, involves all three of those “difficult” issues, given the hot-
button topic of gay rights.
241. Id.
242. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
243. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 131 (noting that Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice John
Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito).
244. Id. at 161 n.20.
245. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974).
246. Nat’l Org. for Reform Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 137 (D.D.C. 1980).
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Bruce Kessler explains that in Carhart the “medical uncertainty
arose” because “Congressional findings that the procedure is never
medically necessary contradicted medical evidence in the lower courts
that in some cases the banned procedure is necessary.” 247 As noted
earlier, Judge Shubb in Welch found similar evidentiary ambiguity
regarding whether SOCE causes harm to minors.248 Carhart sug-
gests that such ambiguity should be tolerated by the Ninth Circuit
if the California legislature acted reasonably in its decision to ban
SOCE for minors.
An argument clearly can be made that the legislature did act
reasonably, given the assertion on appeal to the Ninth Circuit by
several groups, including the California Division of American Asso-
ciation for Marriage and Family and the California Psychological
Association, that “[t]he vast majority of mental health professional
organizations agree that homosexuality is not a mental disorder and
have advised against practices that attempt to change an individual’s
sexual orientation. The vast majority of these organizations have
advised that such attempts can cause long-term harm.” 249
A second similarity between Carhart and the SOCE cases is
their politicization. Stephen Dinan wrote in the Washington Times
shortly after the ruling in Carhart that:
Elections matter, and had John Kerry been elected president a
couple of years ago I think it’s clear that his judges would have
been much more liberal than the two that [President Bush] ap-
pointed to court. . . . I think those who are pro-life and tend to be
more conservative about values should be pleased that their hard
work made a difference. Had the left won a couple of years ago, I
think you would have seen a different decision here.250
The same could be said about the different rulings provided by
Judges Shubb and Mueller. Section B of Part I mentioned the clash-
ing opinions by the political parties in the California legislature.251
The political nature of SOCE arguably is evidenced by the split
between Republicans and Democrats on the issue, even at the level
247. Bruce Kessler, Recent Development in Health Law: Select Recent Court Decisions:
Abortion: Supreme Court Upholds Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Against Facial
Challenge—Gonzales v. Carhart, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 523, 525 (2007).
248. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
249. Brief for American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy–California
Division et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees Urging Aff irmance
at 28, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042  (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-17681).
250. Stephen Dinan, Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Upheld; High Court First for Pro-
hibiting Specif ic Method, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at A01.
251. See supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text.
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of the judiciary. Judge Shubb, nominated by a Republican president,
takes the stance held by the Republicans in California’s legislature,
while Judge Mueller, selected by a Democratic president, clearly sides
with the Democrats.252 That might just be a coincidence, but it is
hard to ignore when such politically charged laws are in play.
In summary, the Court’s ruling in Carhart suggests the Ninth
Circuit must defer to the judgment of California lawmakers in en-
acting the law at issue in Welch and Pickup. Yet Brown indicates
the Ninth Circuit still must closely scrutinize the evidence of causa-
tion of harm stemming from SOCE.253 Further, if Alvarez is correct,
then the mere fact that the speech behind SOCE is false is not suffi-
cient, standing alone, to remove it from the realm of First Amendment
protection. It must also cause harm.254
B. First Amendment Theories: A Trio of Rationales
This section reflects on three key First Amendment theories
that might be used by the Ninth Circuit to determine the constitu-
tionality of California’s anti-SOCE law if the appellate court treats
SOCE as speech rather than conduct. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs-
appellants in Pickup argue in their opening brief to the Ninth Circuit
that SOCE is sufficiently imbued with speech to fall under the um-
brella of the First Amendment.255 Although not mutually exclusive,
the theories described below are meant to provide context, if not com-
plete answers, to the research question posed in the Introduction.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas
The marketplace of ideas theory is, as Professor Matthew Bunker
writes, “one of the most powerful images of free speech.” 256 The theory
holds “that truth will emerge in the long run as long as the market-
place remains free from government intervention and all ideas.” 257 It
252. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
253. See supra text accompanying note 219.
254. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012).
255. The plaintiffs-appellants in Pickup argue that:
The raison d’etre for SOCE counseling is to convey messages regarding how
to address unwanted same-sex attractions, behavior or identity and meet
the therapeutic goals of clients who want to resolve underlying issues and
conflicts. The purpose of the counseling is to communicate a message that
will be understood by the client who wants to hear that message.
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 25–26, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (2013)
(No. 12-17681) (internal citations omitted).
256. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH 2 (2001).
257. Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic Ex-
pression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 26 (2012).
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was first advanced in First Amendment jurisprudence by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States,258 as Yale Law School Dean Robert Post notes.259 In
Abrams, Holmes wrote:
The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.260
That language, as First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla recent-
ly observed, “has come to be thought of in our history as the place
where the marketplace of ideas metaphor first took hold in American
life.” 261 Indeed, Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat asserts that the market-
place theory “has heavily influenced the subsequent development of
free speech jurisprudence.” 262
Under the marketplace theory, the Ninth Circuit in Welch and
Pickup might consider whether medical and public debate regarding
SOCE has sufficiently played out or run its course, as it were, such
that speech-based SOCE today is demonstrably proven as a false
therapy. Put differently, is it the truth that SOCE not only do not
work, but also cause harm to minors? What is the truth about SOCE?
According to the American Psychological Association’s 2009 re-
port, “[r]esearch on SOCE (psychotherapy, mutual self-help groups,
religious techniques) has not answered basic questions of whether
it is safe or effective and for whom.” 263 The APA report, in fact,
“found no empirical research on adolescents who request SOCE.” 264
The report adds that “results of current research are complicated by
the belief system of many of the participants whose religious faith
and beliefs may be intricately tied to the possibility of change.” 265
If the APA’s report is correct, then all that courts like the Ninth
Circuit arguably are left with at this point in time are opinions—not
258. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
259. Post, supra note 82, at 153–57; see Barak Orbach, Political Discourse, Civility,
and Harm: On Hubris, Civility, and Incivility, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 443, 446 (2012) (observ-
ing that “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes formulated the ‘marketplace of ideas’” ).
260. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
261. Rod Smolla, Free Speech and Civil Discourse in the 21st Century: Keynote Address,
5 CHARLESTON L. REV. I, at iv (2011).
262. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specif ic Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
263. APA Report, supra note 79, at 90 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 73.
265. Id. at 91.
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facts—about SOCE. Viewed in this light, the marketplace theory
would seem to support continuing debate about SOCE rather than
its prohibition as to minors.
It is helpful here to look back before Holmes’s dissent in
Abrams to some of John Stuart Mill’s arguments in On Liberty that
serve as the backbone for the marketplace theory.266 One important
concept for Mill was the “assumption of infallibility.” 267 This essen-
tially means that those who suppress opinions because they believe
them to be false assume they are infallible in their own beliefs.268
Mill understood that for those engaged in discussions of public is-
sues “[t]o refuse a hearing to an opinion because they are sure that
it is false is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as
absolute certainty.” 269 When applying this theory to California’s
anti-SOCE law, Mill might accuse California lawmakers of falling
prey to the “assumption of infallibility.” As Professor Bunker writes,
“[t]he core insight of marketplace theory—fallibilism—leads us to
exercise great caution before silencing viewpoints with which we
disagree.” 270 Speech-based SOCE arguably are infused with the
viewpoints of therapists regarding not only SOCE’s effectiveness or
lack thereof, but also homosexuality in general.
Even if one considers self-professed success stories of people
who claim to have been helped by SOCE to be distorted or wrong-
headed,271 Mill asserted that “[t]here is the greatest difference
between presuming an opinion to be true because, with every op-
portunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming
its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation.” 272 Cali-
fornia lawmakers, along with other critics of SOCE, clearly have
the right to let the public know their opinion that conversion therapy
is harmful and ineffective. In fact, if they do not do so, Mill might
claim they were cowards for not acting on what they believe is
“honestly . . . dangerous to the welfare of mankind.” 273
266. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 61, 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1974) (1859).
267. Id. at 77.
268. Id.
269. Id. (emphasis in original).
270. BUNKER, supra note 256, at 8.
271. A group called Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays & Gays (PFOX) f iled a friend-of-
the-court brief in February 2013 in Welch asserting there are “many thousands of others
who have successfully made this transition” and now “are well-adjusted ex-gays.” Brief
for Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays & Gays (PFOX) as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs and Appellees, Supporting Aff irmance at 6, Welch v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042
(9th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-15023).
272. MILL, supra note 266, at 79.
273. Id. at 78.
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Another key for Mill is the so-called harm principle,274 under
which “the state has no legitimate authority to restrict the actions
of an individual except when those actions produce harm to others.” 275
The question, of course, is whether or not speech-based SOCE causes
harm to others, namely minors. The APA report noted above indi-
cates that still has to be resolved.276
Professor Steven Gey in 2008 explored the idea of “socially
worthless untruths,” 277 which some might contend include SOCE,
and why the First Amendment nonetheless often protects such
speech in the marketplace of ideas.278 Gey also addressed First
Amendment protection for “empirically disprovable falsehoods,” 279
such as speech denying the Holocaust. In exploring these concepts,
Gey made a key distinction between normative disagreements and
factual disagreements.280 Today, there not only are normative dis-
agreements about SOCE grounded in religious and political con-
cerns about homosexuality, but also apparent factual disagreements
regarding whether it is harmful, as reflected in the APA report’s
findings. To use Gey’s term, SOCE seemingly is not yet an empiri-
cally disprovable falsehood.
Thus, a possible danger from a marketplace of ideas perspective
is that normative beliefs regarding SOCE—not factual ones—held
by the legislative majority in California are being used to silence
expression in the form of speech-based SOCE on minors. Put differ-
ently and certainly cynically, California lawmakers arguably are
asserting their version of the truth about SOCE based on their
political and religious values, not factual findings. This would be
troubling for Gey, who asserted that “government has no authority
to enforce through legal proscriptions any ideology or use the law to
protect any set of favored ideas.” 281 As Gey put it, “[p]oliticians are
not scholars, and politicians’ claims of factual veracity should never
be taken at face value.” 282
Someday, factual evidence may be clear that speech-based SOCE
is socially worthless and, in fact, false and harmful. The Ninth Circuit
274. See id. at 68 (asserting that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others”).
275. Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 571 (2011).
276. APA Report, supra note 79, at 42.
277. Gey, supra note 90, at 16–22.
278. Id. at 6–9.
279. Id. at 10.
280. Id. at 8–9.
281. Id. at 20.
282. Id. at 22.
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will need to determine whether that day now has come or whether de-
bate should continue before it is driven from the field of free speech.
2. Democratic Self-Governance
There is little disagreement that the First Amendment protects
political speech. The Supreme Court wrote nearly fifty years ago that
the ability to criticize the government is “the central meaning of the
First Amendment.” 283 The theory of democratic self-governance is
premised on the belief that free expression is necessary for the proper
functioning of government and democracy.284 It holds that “the es-
sential objective of the First Amendment is to promote a rich and
valuable public debate.” 285 A necessary corollary of the theory is
that it rests “upon the enlightenment of society and its elected rep-
resentatives.” 286 Philosopher and educator Alexander Meiklejohn
asserted that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion
to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to
express.” 287
A principle related to the sovereignty of the people is that govern-
ment officials are servants rather than rulers.288 According to First
Amendment theorist Thomas Emerson, “[o]nce one accepts the prem-
ise . . . that governments ‘derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed’—it follows that the governed must, in order to exercise
their right of consent, have full freedom of the expression both in form-
ing individual judgments and in forming the common judgment.” 289
The speech at issue in Welch and Pickup—assuming arguendo
that SOCE constitutes speech—is bound up in politics. As the APA’s
2009 report states:
The debate surrounding SOCE has become mired in ideological
disputes and competing political agendas. Some organizations
opposing civil rights for LGBT individuals advocate SOCE. Other
policy concerns involve religious or socially conservative agendas
283. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
284. Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and Reform of the Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (1993).
285. Id.
286. Robert Bork, Neutral Principle and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 28 (1971).
287. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255.
288. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 35–36 (1982).
289. EMERSON, supra note 89, at 7.
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where issues of religious morality conflict with scientific-based
conceptions of positive and healthy development.290
It thus may well be that political agendas are the primary driving
forces both for and against California’s anti-SOCE law, and it cer-
tainly seems difficult to separate the political aspects of SOCE from
therapeutic ones. As noted earlier, California lawmakers divided
along party lines in supporting and opposing the measure.291
The question remains whether or not the political nature of
speech-based SOCE be untangled from the supposedly therapeutic
aspects of SOCE. If the answer is no—if the two are inextricably
intertwined—then SOCE would seem to necessitate heightened
First Amendment protection from Meiklejohnian perspective. If the
answer is yes—separating the political and therapeutic strands is
possible—the argument that speech-based SOCE merits the utmost
First Amendment protection is stripped away.
3. Human Dignity/Autonomy
As suggested in the Introduction, SOCE arguably has a direct
effect on an individual’s interest in self-realization and human
dignity—concepts regarded as “fundamental purposes of the First
Amendment.” 292 This theory, sometimes known as the “liberty
theory,” 293 holds that the importance of free expression lies in the
notion that “[s]peech or other self-expressive conduct is protected
not as a means to achieve a collective good but because of its value
to the individual.” 294 As Thomas Emerson wrote, “freedom of expres-
sion is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment.
The proper end of man is the realization of his character and poten-
tialities as a human being.” 295
If Judge Shubb is correct that SOCE involves speech, then
California’s anti-SOCE law imposes a burden on doctor-patient re-
lationships by restricting both the doctor’s right to speak and the
patient’s right to receive speech.296 The law not only restricts the
speech of the doctor—who provides therapy that presumably is in
line with his or her moral and religious beliefs and thus his or her
290. APA Report, supra note 79, at 92.
291. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
292. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 51 (1989).
293. Id. at 3.
294. Id. at 5.
295. EMERSON, supra note 89, at 6.
296. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
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identity—but also thwarts a patient’s right to receive speech that
could lead to a change in sexual orientation or an affirmation of his
or her self-identity.297
Sexual orientation intuitively seems to cut to the very core of
person’s identity as straight, gay or bisexual. If the Ninth Circuit
accepts the arguments of the proponents of SOCE regarding muta-
bility of sexual orientation, then California’s law removes the pos-
sibility of self-realization through speech for minors who may be
questioning and wrestling with their own sexual orientation.
Simply put, the California law removes choice—the choice of
doctors to say what they believe and the choice of patients to believe
what they hear. This goes against what Vincent Blasi suggests is
one of the most valuable reasons for free expression: “choosing what
to believe and how to interact with others.” 298 Having choices, Blasi
asserts, “is personally fulfilling,” 299 as those who “have made them-
selves what they are through the exercise of their own initiative” 300
are the best people.
The human dignity/autonomy theory of the First Amendment
proposes that the central benefit of freedom of expression is that of
individual self-fulfillment.301 Personal growth in character, decision-
making and autonomous experiences are among the values that are
strengthened when a society enjoys free speech liberties.302 With the
SOCE issue, it is presumable that therapists using this method hold
the moral belief that homosexuality is unnatural and can be reversed.
One might also assume that some patients—even some minors—
seeking SOCE essentially have a level of uncertainty about their self-
identity and that they could potentially benefit from being introduced
to all ideas that may lead to self-discovery, even those perceived by
others to be bad. Regardless of what the outcome of the therapy may
be, this theory provides a rationale that suggests that California’s
SOCE law, by denying freedom of speech, also denies freedom of
thought. First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla encapsulates this
notion: “[t]he linkage of speech to thought, to man’s central capacity
to reason and wonder, is what places speech above other forms of
fulfillment, and beyond the routine jurisdiction of the state.” 303
297. Id. at 1116–17.
298. Blasi, supra note 86, at 74–75 (emphasis added).
299. Id. at 75.
300. Id.
301. SMOLLA, supra note 192, at 9.
302. BUNKER, supra note 256, at 12–13.
303. SMOLLA, supra note 192, at 10.
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C. Summary of Doctrines & Speech Theories as They Might
Apply to California’s Anti-SOCE Law
What level of proof must California demonstrate to safely jet-
tison speech-based SOCE for minors from the realm of First Amend-
ment protection? This part has addressed various doctrines and free
speech theories that the Ninth Circuit might use when reviewing
California’s law. This could prove an exceedingly complex task for
the appellate court. As Yale Law School Dean Robert Post writes,
“[s]ometimes diverse First Amendment theories will require incon-
sistent doctrinal regimes, and when this occurs, courts must decide
which theory is to be given priority.” 304
The APA’s report plausibly can be interpreted as suggesting
that the Ninth Circuit is left without empirical facts proving SOCE
harms minors and that what remains, instead, are differing opin-
ions and anecdotal evidence.305 When dealing with false opinions, as
opposed to empirically false facts, both the marketplace of ideas and
democratic self-governance hold that the government should be last
in line to determine whether an opinion is false.306 Every idea should
have a place at the table. Self-realization that a minor questioning
his sexual orientation might gain through exploring opinions pre-
sented by gay-conversion therapists also lie in the balance. Does not
a person—even a minor, since the Supreme Court in Brown just two
years ago made it clear that “minors are entitled to a significant
measure of First Amendment protection” 307—questioning his sexu-
ality have the right to receive information regarding SOCE?
California’s anti-SOCE law is manifestly wrapped in political,
religious and normative judgments, all of which, as Professor Gey ex-
plains, would “produce strong protections of speech” under the mar-
ketplace theory.308 If the Ninth Circuit considers SOCE to be merely
a false opinion about sexual orientation or one that simply is ineffec-
tive (but not harmful), then core First Amendment values and theo-
ries support its protection. This, in turn, suggests California’s law
should be held to a very high doctrinal standard of review.
If the Ninth Circuit proceeds down this path, then strict scru-
tiny becomes the standard of review. The cases discussed in Section A,
with the exception of Carhart, provide stiff doctrinal burdens Cali-
fornia must overcome in order to constitutionally ban speech-based
304. Post, supra note 82, at 171.
305. APA Report, supra note 79, at 72–73, 90.
306. BUNKER, supra note 256, at 3–10.
307. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011).
308. Gey, supra note 90, at 8–9.
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SOCE and strip it of First Amendment protection.309 In Brown, Cali-
fornia claimed it had a compelling interest in protecting minors from
speech in violent video games; that’s precisely what California is now
doing in Welch and Pickup, but with another type of speech from
which minors must be shielded.310 Given the seeming ambiguity of
proof in the APA report regarding a direct causal link of harm from
SOCE, the battle could boil down to how much deference under
Carhart the Ninth Circuit is willing to cut the California legislature.
If the Ninth Circuit grants such deference and accepts Califor-
nia’s position that SOCE is harmful to minors, then it appears the
law will be struck down because the state would clearly have a com-
pelling interest under strict scrutiny.311 Deference to legislative
judgment thus could be the judicial wildcard affecting the decision,
regardless of what doctrines and/or theories the Ninth Circuit pur-
ports to apply to resolve the First Amendment issues. Indeed, Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote shortly before his retirement from the Court,
that “[t]he degree to which we defer to a judgment by the political
branches must vary up and down with the degree to which that judg-
ment reflects considered, public-minded decisionmaking.” 312 Disputes
thus often revolve around the initial decision regarding “the appro-
priate level of deference.” 313
CONCLUSION
Although this Article sought to provide a comprehensive analy-
sis of the First Amendment issues surrounding the statute at issue
in Welch and Pickup from both a doctrinal and theoretical perspec-
tive, three caveats must be acknowledged. First and foremost, the
research question and the analysis in Part III assumed, for the sake
of argument, that SOCE is sufficiently imbued with speech to fall
under the umbrella of First Amendment protection. It may be that
the Ninth Circuit sides with Judge Mueller in Pickup and declares
that SOCE constitutes conduct, thus rendering the First Amend-
ment analysis an academic exercise, unless the case reaches the
U.S. Supreme Court.314
309. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–44, 2546–57; Brown, 131 S.
Ct. at 2738.
310. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739–42.
311. Id. at 2738.
312. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2830 n.3 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
313. See, e.g., Lopez v. Terrell, 654 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We determine f irst
the appropriate level of deference to afford the agency’s interpretation . . . .” ).
314. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 6021465, at *9–12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
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If, however, the Ninth Circuit sides with Judge Shubb’s catego-
rization of SOCE as speech, the free speech theories addressed here
seemingly provide strong support for protecting SOCE in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, at least up until the time it can be considered an
empirically disprovable and harmful falsehood. The Ninth Circuit
has decidedly strong pro–free speech doctrines from the opinions of
Brown and Alvarez that it might choose to adopt.315
While the Court’s decision in Carhart cuts against protecting
SOCE because it grants deference to legislative choices in instances
of medical uncertainty, it is important to note that the target of the
legislation in Carhart—abortion—clearly centered on conduct (as
a medical procedure) rather than on speech (speech-based SOCE
therapy).316 The Ninth Circuit might use this distinction to distin-
guish Carhart.
A second caveat is that the speech analyzed in this Article
occurs within the context of the medical profession. Doctors are pro-
fessionals who engage in a heavily regulated practice,317 and courts
have suggested restrictions on their speech may be subject to a
standard of review less rigorous than strict scrutiny.318 Indeed, it is
important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court in the abortion-
limitation case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey319 “refused to apply strict scrutiny to the physicians’ com-
pelled speech claims.” 320 Thus, it may be easier to enact or allow re-
strictions on speech within the medical profession. As one federal
judge observed in a 2012 opinion involving the First Amendment
speech interests of physicians, “which constitutional standard should
be applied in professional speech cases is still an unsettled question
of law.” 321
Finally, this Article concentrated on the First Amendment free-
dom of speech. It did not address the interests of parents in the care,
custody and control of their children, which the Supreme Court in
315. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–44, 2546–47 (2012); Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
316. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148, 162–63 (2007).
317. The U.S. Supreme Court asserted more than a century ago that “[t]here is per-
haps no profession more properly open to such regulation than that which embraces the
practitioners of medicine.” Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).
318. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839–40 (1992);
see also Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communications and the First Amendment
After Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 101, 101 (2012).
319. Casey, 505 U.S. at 839–40.
320. Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know:
Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 630
(2012).
321. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262–63 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
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2000 characterized as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.” 322 The Ninth Circuit may well
factor such interests into its analysis when considering parents who
are prevented by California’s law from enrolling their children in
SOCE counseling.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Welch and Brown is
bound to spark outrage in some quarters and draw rave reviews in
others. Such is the nature of any case in which speech interests are
bound up in political, religious and cultural battles. This Article
attempted to illustrate the ways in which complex issues of First
Amendment doctrine and theory might intersect to influence the
outcome. It strove to bridge the gulf between free speech theory and
doctrine, while simultaneously calling scholarly attention to an
issue that easily could, given its controversial nature, work its way
up to the nation’s high court.
322. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
